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ST ATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Jackson, Constantine 
NYSID: 
DIN: 04-B-3073 
Appearances: Rebecca Fox Esq. 
22 U.S. Oval 
Suite 20 
Facility: 
Appeal · 
· Control No.: 
Plattsburgh, New York ~ 29.03 
Clinton CF 
08-187-18 B 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 
months. 
Board Member(s) Shapiro, Agostini, Demosthenes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received February 20, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findillgs and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report; Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified t'o _· ___ _ 
/. _ Affirmed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
L~ _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If t.he Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the se~~te fm.dings qf 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on '.)/J3m if6 . 
i ; 
Distribution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) , 
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     Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 18-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved throwing a man into an icy river 
for being unable to pay off his drug debt, thereby causing his death.  Appellant raises the following 
issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh the required statutory factors, but rather only looked at the instant offense/criminal 
history. 2) the decision lacks detail. 3) the decision failed to comply with statutory language. 4) 
the decision illegally resentenced him. 5) the decision was predetermined. 6) the decision lacks 
future guidance. 7) the decision violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
constitution. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in 
that the positive portions of the COMPAS were ignored, and the statutes are present and 
rehabilitation based. 
 
         Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime (murder), the Board 
considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor 
considered.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 
(3d Dept. 2016). The fact that the inmate committed the instant offense while on community 
supervision is a proper basis for denying parole release.  See, e.g., Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 
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A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Thompson v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014); 
Matter of Guzman v. Dennison, 32 A.D.3d 798, 799, 821 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (1st Dept. 2006). The 
decision did not exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety in case of murder committed while 
on parole.  Matter of Thompson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 120 A.D.3d 1518, 1518-19, 992 
N.Y.S.2d 464, 465 (3d Dept. 2014). 
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     The Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole.  
See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012).   
     The Board stressing the nature of the underlying offense, troubling criminal history and prison 
disciplinary record, does not constitute irrationality bordering on impropriety.  Perez v Evans, 76 
A.D.3d 1130, 907 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dept. 2010); Mentor v New York State Division of Parole, 87 
A.D.3d 1245, 930 N.Y.S.2d 302 (3d Dept. 2011) lv.app.den. 18 N.Y.3d 803, 938 N.Y.S.2d 860 
(2012); Stanley v New York State Division of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132 (2d Dept. 
2012); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 
2016).  
     The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter 
of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
    The Board may consider negative aspects of the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 
148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017) (COMPAS instrument with mixed results 
including substance abuse relevant given use before crime); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 
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A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) (low risk felony violence but probable risk for 
substance abuse alcohol related crimes); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016) (scores not uniformly low including family 
support), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 (2017).   
 
     There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000).  There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative 
fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d 
Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and 
internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 
1371 (2000).   Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its 
duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 
(2d Dept. 1985). There is no merit to the inmate’s contention that the parole interview was 
improperly conducted or that he was denied a fair interview. Black v New York State Board of 
Parole, 54 A.D.3d 1076, 863 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d Dept. 2008); Rivers v Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 
989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014);  Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 
2017).      
 
      That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i 
(2)(c)(A) in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter 
of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 
2016) (citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d 
Dept. 2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  
Matter of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 
727 (2d Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 
857, 858, 796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that 
denied release as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
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Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
    An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
    That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest 
in parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); 
Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 
(3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
              Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular 
evidence on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional 
release. Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process 
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requirement that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d 
Cir. 1975). 
    The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and 
which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
   As for equal protection, the inmate does not specify exactly what group or classification he 
has been placed into, or that any law is discriminatory on its face.  He has not alleged any facts 
that can give rise to an equal protection claim (e.g. showing he has been treated differently than 
others). As such, the petition fails to state a cause of action.  Anderson v Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 
44 (2d Cir. 1982).      Even if this is deemed to be a classification, plaintiff has certainly not alleged 
anything to suggest he is in a suspect class or has been treated invidiously. Nicholas v Tucker, 114 
F.3d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1997); Allen v Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 260 (2d Cir. 1996); Carbonell v 
Acrish, 154 F.Supp.2d 552, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), as prisoners either in the aggregate, or by type 
of offense, are not a suspect class. As long as there is a rational basis for the distinction, it will be 
upheld. Graziano v Pataki, 689 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2012).  Determining the optimal time for parole 
release eligibility elicits multiple legislative classifications  and groupings that are not subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny, but rather only to a rational basis to further a legitimate State purpose. 
McGinnis v Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059, 35 L.Ed2d 282 (1973).  Additionally, the 
equal protection clause will not speculate as to what the primary government purpose might or 
might not be.  One purpose alone is sufficient. (McGinnis, supra, p. 1063). The equal protection 
clause of the New York State Constitution is no more broad than that found in the U.S. 
Constitution.  It covers the same things, and has co-ordinate commands.  Dorsey v Stuyvesant 
Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530-532 (1949)  cert. denied 339 U.S. 981, 70 S.Ct. 1019 (1950). An 
equal protection claim is without merit, as the decision has a rational relationship to the objectives 
of community safety and respect for the law. Valderrama v Travis, 19 A.D.3d 904, 905, 796 
N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dept. 2005); Tatta v Dennison,  26 A.D.3d 663, 809 N.Y.S.2d 296 (3d Dept. 2006) 
denied 6 N.Y.3d 714, 816 N.Y.S.2d 750 (2006);  DeFino v Travis, 18 A.D.3d 1079, 795 N.Y.S.2d 
477 (3rd Dept. 2005); Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 
224 (3d Dept. 2010) lv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143;  Santiago v Alexander, 80 A.D.3d 
1105, 916 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dept. 2011). 
 
      Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
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without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  Siao-Paul 
v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
    Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law 
is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d Dept. 
2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 133 
A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law amendments 
have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. The 
2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but rather, merely increase 
transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s interpretation of its own 
regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 
1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     Appellant’s contention that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 Amendments to the 
Executive Law is likewise without merit.  Although Appellant alleges the amendments represented 
a fundamental change in the legal regime governing parole determinations requiring a focus on 
forward-looking factors, this proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  The 
Board still must conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 
A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014).  Thus, even where the First Department 
has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has 
nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every 
factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement that the Board prioritize “factors which 
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emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st Dept. 2016).   
 
    Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  The amended regulation was 
intended to increase transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if 
and when the Board departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY 
Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.   
 
    The 2011 amendments still permit the Board to place greater emphasis on the gravity of the crime.  
Matter of Montane v Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866  (3d Dept.) appeal dismissed 24 
N.Y.3d 1052, 999 N.Y.S.2d 360 (2014); Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 
1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014); Moore v New York State Board of Parole, 137 A.D.3d 
1375, 26 N.Y.S.3d 412 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board can still consider the nature of the inmate’s 
crimes, the  criminal history, the  prison disciplinary record, the  program accomplishments and post 
release plans. Rivera v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014). The Board is obligated to consider the serious nature of the crime. Khatib v New York 
State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014).       
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
